

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

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R 011528Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5239

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 12729

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: UK, US, PFOR

SUBJECT: STOESSEL CONVERSATION WITH FCO DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY WRIGHT.

SUMMARY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL CALLED ON FCO
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OLIVER WRIGHT OCTOBER 31, 1973, FOR
ONE-HOUR TOUR D'HORIZON. CONVERSATION WAS CORDIAL AND
CONSTRUCTIVE. STOESSEL EXPLAINED US DISAPPOINTMENT OVER
LACK OF ALLIED SUPPORT IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, AND WRIGHT
SUGGESTED THAT GREATER CONSULTATION AND EXPLANATION BY US
MIGHT HAVE MINIMIZED DIFFERENCES. WRIGHT HOPED THAT TWO
MORE US-EC MEETINGS, IN CONJUNCTION PERHAPS WITH

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POLITICAL DIRECTORS NOVEMBER 12-13 AND NATO MINISTERS
DECEMBER 10, WOULD SUFFICE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON TEXT OF
DECLARATION. WRIGHT URGED US TO HAVE PATIENCE WITH

EUROPEANS AS THEY TOOK FIRST TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARDS POLITICAL UNITY AND CITED "TREMENDOUS PROGRESS" ON ECONOMIC ISSUES OVER PAST YEAR AS EVIDENCE OF WHAT HARD DIPLOMATIC SLOGGING COULD ACHIEVE. END SUMMARY.

1. FRESH FROM A MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, WRIGHT OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY NOTING THAT SIR ALEC WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE COMMONS ON FOREIGN POLICY LATER IN THE DAY. HE WOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT THE WESTERN ALLIANCE MIGHT BE GOING THROUGH A BUMPY PASSAGE RIGHT NOW, BUT THAT US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS WERE BASED ON PERMANENT COMMON INTERESTS THAT TRANSCENDED THESE DIFFICULTIES. SIR ALEC WOULD NOT TAKE UP ANY DEBATING POINTS. STOESSEL SAID THIS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL AND NOTED THAT WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMEN HAD ALSO MADE POSITIVE POINTS PREVIOUS DAY.

2. STOESSEL EXPLAINED STRONG US FEELING THAT IT HAD BEEN LET DOWN BY ITS ALLIES, EXCEPT PORTUGAL, OVER QUESTION OF RESUPPLYING ISRAEL, AND SAID IT WAS JUST AS WELL THAT THIS FEELING SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR. WRIGHT COUNTERED BY ARGUING THAT PURPOSES FOR WHICH NATO HAD BEEN ORGANIZED DID NOT APPLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THAT HEAVY EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST OIL MADE IT INEVITABLE THAT US AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES WOULD DIFFER, AND THAT US COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL WAS OF A DIFFERENT NATURE THAN EUROPEAN COMMITMENT. THESE DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE LOOKED AT CLEARLY BUT CALMLY, HE SAID, AND PEOPLE SHOULD NOT GET ANGRY WHEN THE DIFFERENCES SURFACE.

3. STOESSEL AGREED THAT US AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT MIGHT DIFFER, BUT POINTED OUT THERE WAS AN EAST-WEST DIMENSION TO THE CONFLICT AS WELL. SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE AREA TROUBLED US AND WE HAD ASSUMED THAT ALL MEMBERS OF NATO WOULD HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN THWARTING SOVIET EXPANSION THERE. IF ALL ARAB STATES WERE RADICALIZED THROUGH SOVIET PENETRATION OF MIDDLE EAST, WESTERN INTERESTS OVERALL--

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INCLUDING OIL SUPPLY--WOULD SUFFER. STOESSEL THOUGHT THIS DIMENSION HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATED.

4. WRIGHT AGREED THAT OUR BASIC INTERESTS WERE CLOSE, BUT SUGGESTED THAT A MORE INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT BY THE US TO CONSULT WITH ITS ALLIES AND TO EXPLAIN THE RATIONALE FOR ITS ACTIONS MIGHT HAVE ELICITED GREATER SUPPORT. STOESSEL SAID THAT THE SWIFT PACE OF EVENTS HAD DIMINISHED THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR AS FULL A CONSULTATION AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DESIRABLE. BOTH MEN AGREED THAT IT WAS BEST NOW TO AVOID FURTHER RECRIMINATIONS AND TO

LOOK AHEAD TO WAYS AND MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THE
ALLIANCE.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

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R 011528Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5240

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

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5. US-EC DECLARATION - TURNING TO THE STATE OF PLAY ON
THE DECLARATION, WRIGHT SAID UK WAS PRESSING COMMIS-
SION TO COMPLETE WORK ON ECONOMIC PARAGRAPHS AND THAT
ANOTHER US-EC MEETING ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 13 WOULD BE
FINE. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ONE ADDITIONAL MEETING
AFTER THAT, PERHAPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH NATO MINISTERIAL
SESSIONS IN DECEMBER, MIGHT SUFFICE TO PUT FINISHING
TOUCHES ON DECLARATION. STOESEL SUGGESTED HAVING ONE
MORE GO ON "PARTNERSHIP." WRIGHT DID NOT FEEL THIS WOULD
BE PRODUCTIVE. HE THOUGHT THE TWO SIDES WERE NOT FAR
APART SUBSTANTIVELY, AND ADDED WISTFULLY "IF ONLY SOME-
ONE COULD FIND ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE." STOESEL ALSO

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STRESSED THE THOUGHT THAT DECLARATION SHOULD BE SEEN AS A BEGINNING, NOT AN END, AND URGED THAT LANGUAGE ON THIS POINT BE STRENGTHENED.

6. EXPANDING ON A FAVORITE BRITISH THEME, WRIGHT SAID UK WAS GRATEFUL TO US FOR APRIL 23 SPEECH WHICH HAD STIMULATED EC TO MOVE TOWARDS GENUINE UNITY, BUT US SHOULD NOT PUSH EUROPEANS TO PROMISE MORE THAN THEY CAN PERFORM AT THIS EARLY STAGE. IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE A LONG VIEW AND TO BE PATIENT. THE UK, HE SAID, HAS AS MUCH TO GAIN AS ANYONE FROM RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNITY, BUT IF DEVELOPMENT WAS TO BE SURE AND LASTING, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED ON COMPLETE MUTUAL CONSENT AND COMPLEX MUTUAL CONCESSIONS, AND THIS TOOK TIME.

7. IN CONCLUSION WRIGHT MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR SUPPLEMENTING US-EC MULTILATERAL DEALINGS WITH INTENSIVE BILATERAL CONTACTS. THERE WAS NO SUBSTITUTE, HE SAID, FOR PATIENT DIPLOMATIC SLOGGING AND CITED AS EVIDENCE TREMENDOUS PROGRESS MADE ON SUCH ISSUES AS GATT MANDATE, REVERSE PREFERENCES, AND DOLLAR AREA QUOTAS. BAD-TEMPERED US-EC RELATIONS AT OPENING OF YEAR HAVE YIELDED TO EVEN-TEMPERED NEGOTIATIONS.

8. NATO DECLARATION - WRIGHT HAD LESS TO SAY ON NATO DECLARATION SINCE THIS DOES NOT FALL WITHIN HIS JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, BUT HE DID PRAISE FRENCH DRAFT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT GENERAL CHANGE IN FRENCH ATTITUDES OVER PAST FOUR MONTHS WAS ALMOST BEYOND BELIEF, AND THAT HE HOPED US RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD UK-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP IN BRINGING THIS ABOUT. ON SUBJECT OF DEALING WITH THE FRENCH, WRIGHT SAID IT WAS FUTILE TRYING TO COMMIT THEM IN ADVANCE TO SOMETHING AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, BUT THAT AS MATTER OF PRACTICE, ONCE THE NEED FOR PARTICULAR ACTION HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED, FRENCH COULD OFTEN BE BROUGHT ALONG. CLEARLY HAVING IN MIND THE FRENCH AVERSION TO ANY INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF US-EC DIALOGUE, WRIGHT NOTED THAT FRENCH HAD NONETHELESS AGREED TO THE HOLDING OF ALL MEETINGS REQUIRED THUS FAR.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 11 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ALLIANCE, AGREEMENT DRAFT, MEETINGS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, DECLARATION, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: mcintyresh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973LONDON12729
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS-1
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P750023-0632
From: LONDON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731166/abqcefuq.tel
Line Count: 215
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: mcintyresh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <12-Jul-2001 by boyleja, 3.4.X6, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORM>; APPROVED <23-Jul-2001 by mcintyresh>;
RELEASED <23-Jul-2001 by mcintyresh>; APPROVED <23-Jul-2001 by mcintyresh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: STOESSEL CONVERSATION WITH FCO DEPUTY UNDER
TAGS: PFOR, US, XF, EEC, NATO, (STOESSEL), (WRIGHT, OLIVER)
To: STATE
ATHENS
BONN
BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN
LISBON

LUXEMBOURG
OSLO
OTTAWA
PARIS
REYKJAVIK
ROME
THE HAGUE
BERLIN
NATO BRUSSELS
DUBLIN
EC BRUSSELS

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005